19 November 2009

Local Elections 2010 (II)

The news that the multiparty working group on the election code has failed to reach an agreement on new local election rules is discouraging. Not because participants could not reach a consensus, but because of the suggestion by MP Pavle Kublashvili (UNM) that the working group format has exhausted itself.

The point of the working group is to enable a compromise to be reached, not simply engage in the process of dialogue just to toss the format aside at the first suggestion that participants cannot agree. The working group should not be set aside, even if the consequence is to push back the election date to give participants time to reach an agreement (which, actually, I don't believe is that negative a consequence).

The good news is that participants appear to have (largely) agreed on 2 of the 3 main elements of a revised code: a 50-seat party list/majoritarian system for the Tbilisi city council and a major role for opposition parties in selecting the CEC chairman. This consensus is welcome and impressive. [NOTE: Details are in this statement by the Alliance for Georgia.]

The sticking point is the percentage needed for a first-round victory in the direct election of the Tbilisi mayor (which I'll have more to say about in my next post). The government and the main parliamentary opposition (Christian Democrats) support a 30% threshold while the main nonparliamentary opposition in the working group (Alliance for Georgia) seeks 50% , but expresses a willingness to go lower.

First of all, let's take the question of compromise -- the reason for the working group in the first place (and something that should be a major objective of any democracy promotion policy in Georgia). The ruling party says that 30% is their compromise figure, since they originally wanted no threshold at all.

This is not really so convincing. The government's starting point for negotiation should be the existing institutional framework that they have perpetuated and developed. The relevant existing rules are: a) majoritarian "block" deputies of the city council are elected with 30% of the vote; b) the mayor is elected by the city council with a simple majority; and c) majoritarian deputies in the national parliament are elected with 30% of the vote (see the election code and the law on the capital city -- here are the relevant draft amendments).

All together, this strongly suggests that at least 30% should be considered the government's starting point for negotiation. A simple plurality has never been (to my knowledge) an element of the electoral rules at either national or local government levels. Moreover, given the importance of a directly elected mayor, it would seem that the baseline should be at least as high as that for city council members and parliamentarians.

So the government (and CDM, for reasons that remain opaque) support 30%. Alliance for Georgia supports 50%. One can only deduce that a reasonable compromise is 40%.

In support of such a compromise, a quick canvas through democratic Eastern Europe suggests that only Albania and Ukraine have lower thresholds for mayoral elections (they both have simple plurality rules). The rest require a 50% victory or indirectly elect their mayors through city councils. [CORRECTION: As MP David Darchiashvili points out in a comment below, systems are more diverse than I thought. Hungary, Slovakia, and Bosnia also have plurality-based mayoral elections, so institutionally a 30% threshold is not so out of line.] And 40%, while unconventionalon the low end, is not unprecedented: at least two U.S. cities, Albuquerque, New Mexico and Berkeley, California, have 40% thresholds for victory in direct mayoral elections (as does New York City's mayoral election primaries) [Thanks to Georgetown grad student Dave Lonardo for that].

Finally, aside from its virtue as a compromise, in the Georgian context, a threshold that is lower than 50% makes some sense. Whether the victor is from the opposition or the ruling party, he or she will become a serious contender for the presidency. A 50% victory would grant the new mayor enormous popular legitimacy. Obviously the ruling party doesn't want an opposition mayor to have such a mandate in the leadup to presidential elections -- better they win in Tbilisi with 31% of the vote than with 51% -- but it also may not want their own candidate to have such legitimacy either! The jockeying for position to be the UNM's presidential candidate has barely begun; a majority-elected UNM mayor would virtually preempt that contest. And in general, its not clear that what Georgian democracy needs is a more individual-based political system regardless of who wins the mayoral election.

Even so, 30% is too low to build confidence. Besides the fact that the nonparliamentary opposition thinks it too low, there are too many concerns about the "imbalance" of (administrative) resources and their potential misuse giving an unfair structural advantage to the ruling party's candidate. Michael Posner, US assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, suggested in Tbilisi the other day that it was important that a "level playing field" be established for the local elections. Its not clear that a 30% threshold does that.

The electoral working group should not be thrown away. A compromise consensus on the threshold should be established.

4 comments:

  1. Cory, I'm really glad you're doing this. And starting with the most important issue. A most auspicious beginning!

    If you're doing a second post on this topic, can you take up the question of what 30% and 50% mean within the context of Georgian politics? Which is more conducive to the development of stable and responsible political parties?

    Miriam Lanskoy

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  2. Cory,
    I join Miriam in thanking you for putting up this blog.... although the title "democratic Georgia" might be a tad ambitious.....

    To take a stab at Miriam's question, and I too am curious what you think, I think a PR system in the legislature should bring a number of political parties. Yet the Georgian context seems to want overwhelming mandates for their leaders. Mayoral elections, SMD as they must be, should limit the parties that are competitive for that spot, but I wonder if that won't lead to more personalized party platforms rather than fewer.

    Julie George

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  3. This is a very useful exercise, and the sample post is a thoughtful and balanced one. The suggestion that the both too hard and too easy an UNM victories for mayor pose risks to the existing distribution of power is intelligent.
    I only want to comment on the "opaque" reasons why the Christian Democratic Movement is supporting the UNM position on the mayoral election threshold. There is a very widespread view in Georgia that the CDM is not completely independent of the government, a view that you hear not only from oppositionists but even from its own activists. There was recently a split in the CDM over the desire of some members to campaign against some companies close to the government who were allegedly damaging the health of citizens in their regions, a campaign cancelled, according to its advocates, by the central leadership of the CDM lest it offend these companies or the government. While published allegations about the government-organized funding of the CDM or its UNM help for it in the regions might be based on rumors, there is a pattern of trading favors on current public issues.

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  4. [I'm posting this on behalf of MP David Darchiashvili, Chairman, Committee on European Integration, who emailed me the below:]

    First of all, there are some other places in former communist countries to my knowledge, where mayors are elected directly but without thresholds (Bosnia, Slovakia, Hungary). The practice of well established democracies also shows that there is no direct link between thresholds and democracy in this particular case.

    And there is another reason for not having a 50% threshold: We have it for nationwide presidential elections. At the same time, some people from the opposition side perceive city elections not as a fight for municipal policies, power, responsibilities and rights, but as a "liberation" of the city from the central government. With such a background, whoever wins with the "presidential" threshold in Tbilisi, which is inhabited by about 1/3 of the total population and where the lion's share of national resources are concentrated, might have the temptation to perceive him/herself as an alternative nationwide power-center, notwithstanding what is written in the constitution or in relevant laws and the city charter. Georgia is a rather young transitional country to count on a political culture which would not allow such perceptions to be spread and converted into non-constitutional behavior. It might translate into a kind of confusion on a mass scale in the public services, which are also rather young institutionally and professionally. That is the reality aspect; if overlooked, we will risk paving the road to hell with whatever good intentions. If you agree to this argument, would a 40% threshold definitely save us from such a scenario?

    On the working group: It had worked for months and UNM representatives were showing "strategic patience", a lot was agreed upon, and on rather important issues, as you say. Now, when one actor talks in the style of an ultimatum, forgetting everything that has been agreed, and it frustrates the representative of the UNM, its more explainable than not. I do believe that emotions will still give way to a rational process, but if not, everything will be pleasant for Mr. Alasania and his colleagues, who were insisting on a 50% threshold until now; the process can really not be continued indefinitely, especially if other actors show greater inclination to start election preparations on jointly accepted grounds.

    With best regards,

    David Darchiashvili
    Chairman,
    Committee on European Integration
    Parliament of Georgia

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